Florida Journal of International Law
Volume 6

Issue 2

Article 3

January 1991

The Hague Convention: Selfish U.S. Interpretation Aggravates
Foreign Signatories and Mandates Changes to Federal Discovery
Rules
Mark A. Cotter

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/fjil

Recommended Citation
Cotter, Mark A. (1991) "The Hague Convention: Selfish U.S. Interpretation Aggravates Foreign Signatories
and Mandates Changes to Federal Discovery Rules," Florida Journal of International Law: Vol. 6: Iss. 2,
Article 3.
Available at: https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/fjil/vol6/iss2/3

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by UF Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Florida Journal of International Law by an authorized editor of UF Law Scholarship Repository. For
more information, please contact kaleita@law.ufl.edu.

Cotter: The Hague Convention: Selfish U.S. Interpretation Aggravates Fore

THE HAGUE EVIDENCE CONVENTION: SELFISH

U.S. INTERPRETATION AGGRAVATES FOREIGN SIGNATORIES
AND MANDATES CHANGES TO FEDERAL DISCOVERY RULES*
I.

INTRODUCTION ...........................

II. BACKGROUND - CONFLICTING DISCOVERY METHODS
III. THE HAGUE EVIDENCE CONVENTION ..............
IV. AROSPATIALE AND SUBSEQUENT U.S. LOWER
COURT DECISIONS .........................

237

237

A.
B.
C.

VII.

234
236

A.
B.

A~rospatiale .............................
Subsequent Lower Court Applications of
Arospatiale .............................

V. FOREIGN RESPONSES TO EXTRATERRITORIAL
DISCOVERY REQUESTS .....................

VI.

233

Blocking Statutes ..........................
Foreign Judicial Interpretationof the Convention.
Positions Expressed by Foreign Signatory
Governments .............................

PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO FEDERAL RULES OF
CIVIL PROCEDURE ........................
AN ALTERNATIVE FRAMEWORK FOR THE PROPOSED
DISCOVERY RULES ........................
I.

239
242

243
245
247

248
251

INTRODUCTION

Most countries do not have the extensive discovery rights accorded
litigants in federal courts of the United States (U.S.) under the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure (Federal Rules). Civil law countries, in particular, do not allow extensive discovery and, therefore, view requests
for discovery of evidence located in that country's territory under the
Federal Rules as an infringement of their sovereignty. Despite the
existence of the Hague Evidence Convention on the Taking of Evidence Abroad (Convention),1 recent decisions of the U.S. Supreme

Mark A. Cotter graduated from the University of Florida College of Law in 1991 and
currently works for the Tampa, FL law firm of Bush, Ross, Gardner, Warren & Rudy, P.A.
1. The Hague Convention on the Taking of Evidence Abroad in Civil or Commercial Matters,
opened for signature Mar. 18, 1970, 23 U.S.T. 2555, reprinted in 28 U.S.C.A. § 1781 (West
Supp. 1991) [hereinafter Hague Evidence Convention].
*
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Court and lower federal courts indicate a dire need to reconcile U.S.
interests in full and adequate disclosure of evidence with foreign sensitivities to overbroad U.S. discovery requests. Given the expanding
international scope of U.S. business interests, and the foreseeable
increase in transnational civil and commercial litigation, the need for
handling discovery requests made
a better functioning mechanism for
2
abroad is particularly compelling.
This article offers suggestions to resolve this need for a better
discovery mechanism within the framework of the existing Convention.
The article will begin by discussing the conflict between civil and
common law discovery rights, the basic procedures of the Convention,
and the morass of district court decisions leading up to the Supreme
Court's decision in Arospatiale. Next, the article will discuss lower
court decisions which exemplify the difficulties inherent in the application of the comity analysis set forth by the Supreme Court in Agrospatiale. Finally, the proposed amendments to the Federal Rules are
commented upon, leading hopefully to an alternative formulation by
which litigants may obtain worthwhile discovery abroad without unduly encroaching upon the foreign sovereignty of signatory states.
II.

BACKGROUND -

CONFLICTING DISCOVERY METHODS

Pursuant to the Federal Rules, litigants in U.S. courts may obtain
evidence before trial from parties and non-parties alike through a host
of discovery devices. However, this evidence is limited to information
"reasonably calculated to lead to discovery of admissible evidence. '' 4
Conversely, the allowable scope of discovery in most other countries
is far more restricted.
In civil law countries, judges typically conduct discovery rather
than the parties themselves and are far less intrusive. In Germany,
for instance, judges may only obtain evidence if it is probative of some
issue of fact. Additionally, judges examine witnesses and then prepare
a summary of the testimony-a verbatim transcript is rarely prepared similarly, in France, judges have exclusive power to order discovery, which is also summarized in lieu of a verbatim transcript.

2. See, e.g., S & S Screw Machine Co. v. Cosa Corp., 647 F. Supp. 600, 618 (M.D. Tn.
1986) ("international civil litigants might benefit from the formulation of standards more reproducible in their application than the necessarily fact-laden comity inquiry").
3. Soci~td Nationale Industrielle Adrospatiale v. United States District Court for the Southern District of Iowa, 482 U.S. 522 (1987).
4. Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1).
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Another important difference between U.S. and other countries'
discovery rules is pre-trial discovery, which is nonexistent in civil law
countries because pre-trial and trial phases are non-distinguishable.
In Great Britain, a common law country, pre-trial discovery is available
only from parties to the action. Hence, there is no pre-trial discovery
from third parties. 5 Finally, while "fishing expeditions" are all too
common in the U.S., they are simply not tolerated in other countries.
Therefore, a very large gap exists between U.S.-style discovery and

that of other countries.
The basic problem which emanates from these fundamental differences arises when U.S. courts seek to obtain evidence abroad. Historically, when a U.S. court has personal jurisdiction 7 over a party or
witness, the court could seek direct discovery from the witness pursuant to the Federal Rules by reasoning that the evidence was to be
"produced" in the U.S. and was, therefore, not an infringement on
foreign sovereignty.8
In situations where a foreign person is not subject to the personal
jurisdiction of a U.S. court and refuses to voluntarily give evidence,
the U.S. court would have to seek the assistance of foreign courts.
Typically, courts use a letter rogatory, which is a formal request to
the courts of another country for judicial assistance.9 The main disadvantage to this procedure is that the foreign court is under no obligation to comply, absent some bilateral agreement with the U.S., and
the results are typically less than desirable. 10

5. South Carolina Ins. v. Assurantie Maatschappij "De Zeven Provincien" N.V., [1988] 3
W.L.R. 398, 404 (H.L. 1986) (per Lord Brandon) ("There is no way in which a party to an
action in the High Court in England can compel pre-trial discovery as against a person who is
not a party to such action. .. ."),
6. See, e.g., Radio Corp. of Am. v. Rauland Corp., [1956] 1 Q.B. 618, 649 (C.A.), quoted
with approval in Rio Tinto Zinc Corp. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., [1978] 2 W.L.R. 81, 87

(H.L.).
7. Personal jurisdiction for discovery purposes requires sufficient "minimum contacts" with
the forum resulting from "some act by which the defendant purposefully avails itself of the
privilege of conducting activities within the forum state." Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235,
253 (1958), quoting International Shoe Co. v. State of Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
8. See, e.g., Anschuetz & Co., GmbH, 754 F.2d 602, 615 (5th Cir. 1985), vacated, 483 U.S.
1002 (1987), and remanded, 838 F.2d 1362 (5th Cir. 1988); Laker Airways v. Pan American
World Airways, 103 F.R.D. 42 (D.D.C. 1984); Graco v. Kremlin, Inc., 101 F.R.D. 503 (N.D.
Ill. 1984).
9. See, e.g., United States v, Paraffin Wax, 23 F.R.D. 289 (E.D.N.Y. 1959).
10. For example, a U.S. litigant may not be able to obtain a verbatim transcript and may
not have an opportunity to conduct the examination. See, e.g., Harry L. Jones, International
Judicial Assistance: Procedural Chaos and a Programfor Reform, 62 YALE L.J. 615, 529-34
(1953).
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Problems arise when a foreign state perceives efforts by U.S.
courts to obtain evidence within its territory as a violation of its
judicial sovereignty. This may result in an outright denial of the disrequest
covery request 1' or a substantial limitation of the discovery
12
rules.
discovery
own
state's
foreign
the
to comply with
III.

THE HAGUE EVIDENCE CONVENTION

In order to bridge the fundamental differences between discovery
rules used in civil and common law countries, the United States in
1972 adopted the Hague Convention.3 The purpose of the Convention
was to "improve mutual judicial cooperation in civil or commercial
15
matters."14 Twenty-one countries are now parties to the Convention,
which includes most western trading partners of the U.S.
The Convention allows a signatory state to seek evidence abroad
by sending a Letter of Request to another signatory state; the other
signatory state is then required to fulfill the request. The Convention
also allows two alternative methods of conducting discovery abroad.
A diplomatic or consular officer of the signatory country where the
action is pending may obtain evidence in the other signatory country.
Alternatively, the litigant may request that a specially-appointed commissioner obtain evidence in the other signatory country. Evidence
taken pursuant to a Letter of Request, no matter which method is
6
employed, is taken according to the procedures of the requested state.
However, a litigant can request the foreign court to follow a "special
method or procedure" unless it is "incompatible with the internal law
• . . or is impossible to perform by reason of its internal practice or
procedure.' ' 17 Significantly, the Convention also provides that the re-

11. See, e.g., Westinghouse Elec. Corp. & Duquesne Light Co., (1977) 16 O.R. 2d 278 (Ont.
H.C.) (evidence was requested for pre-trial discovery purposes, not for purposes of trial, and
was not viewed as necessary for purposes of justice since it was available from other sources).
12. See, e.g., Rio Tinto Zinc Corp. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., [1978] 2 W.L.R. 81 (H.L.).
13. See Hague Evidence Convention, supra note 1.
14. Id.
15. These include: Argentina, Barbados, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Finland, France, Federal Republic of Germany, Israel, Italy, Luxembourg, Mexico, Monaco, Netherlands,
Norway, Portugal, Singapore, Spain, Sweden, United Kingdom, and United States. 28 U.S.C.A.
§ 1781 (1991).
16. See Hague Evidence Convention, supra note 1, art. 9.
17. Id. By this provision, the Convention seeks to encourage cases such as J. Barber &
Sons v. Lloyd's Underwriters, [1987] 1 Q.B. 103, where an English court executed letters
rogatory asking that depositions be recorded on video tape even though this was not permitted
by English rules of procedure.
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quested state "apply the appropriate measures of compulsion in the
''
instances and to the same extent as are provided by its internal law. 8
Under the procedures of the Convention, a requested state is required to fulfill the evidence request but may refuse in limited circumstances where its "sovereignty or security are threatened."' 19 The
effectiveness of the Convention is further limited by Article 23, which
permits a signatory state to declare that it "will not execute Letters
of Request issued for the purpose of obtaining pre-trial discovery of
documents."2 Unfortunately, nearly all signatory states have made
2
such declarations. '
Lastly, Article 27 allows a state to utilize alternative methods or
procedures which are less restrictive than those of the Convention.
Disappointingly, the Convention fails to indicate whether, and in what
circumstances, a litigant must use the Convention's procedures. This
ambiguity caused divergent opinions among U.S. courts as to whether
the Convention is mandatory or merely optional. The majority of early
U.S. lower court decisions refused to adopt a rule of first-resort to
the Convention and held instead that use of the Convention was an
optional supplement to use of the Federal Rules.- However, confusion
and ambiguity resulted when other courts interpreted the Convention
as either exclusive or preferential.- Due to the conflicting interpretations which emanated from lower courts, and the evident displeasure
of other signatory countries, the U.S. Supreme Court, in 1987, finally
considered the applicability of Convention procedures in relation to
the Federal Rules in the Agrospatiale decision.

IV.

AEROSPATIALE AND SUBSEQUENT U.S. LOWER
COURT DECISIONS

A.

A6rospatiale

In the Agrospatiale decision,- the plaintiffs brought suit in federal
18. See Hague Evidence Convention, supra note 1, art. 10.
19. Id. art. 12.
20. Id. art. 23.
21. Except for Israel, Czechoslovakia, and the United States, all member states have made
various types of art. 23 declarations, ranging from a complete refusal to execute pre-trial
requests for documents, to limited declarations refusing execution except for specified documents.
22. See, e.g., Lasky v. Continental Products Corp., 569 F. Supp. 1227, 1228 (E.D. Pa.
1983); Graco, 101 F.R.D. at 523-24; Laker Airways, 103 F.R.D. at 42.
23. See, e.g., Pierburg GbmH & Co. v. Superior Court, 186 Cal. Rptr. 876 (Ct. App. 1982);
Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft v. Superior Court, 176 Cal. Rptr. 874 (Ct. App. 1981);
Philadelphia Gear Corp. v. American Pfauter Corp., 100 F.R.D. 58 (E.D.Pa. 1983); Compagnie
Francaise D'Assurance v. Phillips Petroleum Co:, 105 F.R.D. 16 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).
24. Soci6t6 Nationale Industrielle Agrospatiale, 482 U.S. at 522.
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court against two French corporations2 following an airplane crash in
Iowa. The plane was designed, manufactured and marketed by the
defendants. Due to the defendant's extensive U.S. advertising of the
plane, personal jurisdiction was uncontested.26 However, a discovery
impasse resulted when the plaintiffs sought production of documents,
answers to interrogatories and admissions under the Federal Rules.
The defendants answered by moving for a protective order, claiming
the Convention dictated exclusive use of its provisions and that the
defendants did not have to comply with the discovery request under
French law.27
Although the Court rendered a 5-4 decision, the Court held unanimously that the Convention was an optional method for discovery of
evidence located abroad. In addition, the Court refused to rule that
the Convention was inapplicable when evidence was sought from parties to the litigation or where the evidence was to be produced in the
U.S.- Thus, the Court refused to limit the Convention's use to evidence taking from foreign third parties located outside the U.S. or to
evidence taking located in the foreign state itself.
In addition, Justice Stevens, writing for the majority, declined to
adopt a rule of "first-resort" to the Convention 29 as the French defendants had urged. Instead, Justice Stevens held that use of the Convention depended on a case-by-case balancing "of the particular facts,
sovereign interests, and likelihood that resort to those procedures will
prove effective." 3° Although the Court refused to "articulate specific
rules to guide the delicate task of adjudication, ' ' 31 the majority
suggested consideration of the above factors, as well as other factors
relevant to a comity analysis, such as:
(1) the importance to the . . . litigation of the documents
or other information requested;
(2) the degree of specificity of the request;

25. Socit6 Nationale Industrielle Adrospatiale is a wholly owned corporation of the French
government, and Societe de Construction d'Avions de Tourism is a wholly owned subsidiary of
the former corporation. Id. at 524 n.2.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 525-26. Defendants cited French Penal Code Law No. 80-538. This law is the
French "blocking statute" prohibiting its nationals from complying with requests for information
from abroad and making a violation of the statute a criminal offense.
28. Thus, this implicitly embraces the rationale that discovery could be ordered pursuant
to the Federal Rules if it was located abroad but to be "produced" in the U.S. See supra note 8.
29. Soci6tM Nationale Industrielle Agrospatiale, 482 U.S. at 541.
30. Id. at 544.
31. Id. at 546.
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(3) whether the information originated in the United States;
(4) the availability of alternative means of securing the information; and
(5) the extent to which the noncompliance with the request
would undermine important interests of the United States,
or compliance with the request would undermine important
interests of the State where the information is located. 2
Finally, in addition to exhibiting a general dislike for the Convention,- the Court hinted that the burden of persuasion should fall on
the party seeking to use the Convention procedures, rather than the
Federal Rules.m
In a separate opinion, concurring in part and dissenting in part,
Justice Blackmun, writing for the minority, criticized the majority's
ad hoc analysis for failing to provide any meaningful guidance to lower
courts. 5 In Blackmun's view, principles of comity necessitated a gen-

eral presumption in favor of first-resort to the Convention s6 Under
Blackmun's tripartite analysis which determines whether principles of
comity require the use of the Convention, a court considers the interests of the foreign state, the interests of the U.S., and the mutual
interests of nations in a smoothly functioning international legal regime.

37

B.

Subsequent Lower Court Applications of Arospatiale

Unfortunately, lower court decisions following Agrospatiale illustrate the lack of guidance provided by the majority's ad hoc comity
analysis. In the words of one court, "regrettably, the Court [in Agrospatiale] declined to set forth specific rules to guide" the analysis.3

32. Id. at 544, quoting, Restatement of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States
(Revised) § 437(1)(c) (Tent. Draft No. 7, 1986) (approved May 14, 1986).
33. Id. at 542-43 ("unduly time consuming and expensive, as well as ... inconsistent with
the overriding interest in the 'just, speedy, and inexpensive determination' of litigation in our
courts").
34. Id. at 546 n.30 ("The district court may therefore require, .. . that the] party [urging
resort to the treaty] bear the burden. .. ."). For post-Adrospatialecases following this interpretation, see infra note 41 and accompanying text.
35. Justice Blackmun focused on the "risk that the case-by-case comity analysis ... [would]
be performed inadequately and that the somewhat unfamiliar procedures of the Convention will
be invoked infrequently." SociWt Nationale Industrielle Arospatiale, 482 U.S. at 548.
36. Id. at 548-49.
37. Id. at 555.
38. Scarminach v. Goldwell GmbH, 531 N.Y.S. 2d 188, 189 (Sup. Ct. 1988).
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Even worse, another court, frustrated in its purported attempt to
apply the majority's ad hoc comity analysis, relied almost exclusively
on Justice Blackmun's tripartite analysis to support its comity findings3 9
Moreover, Blackmun's prediction of a pro-forum bias in favor of
using the Federal Rules instead of the Convention- was borne out by
lower court decisions. Many of the lower court decisions achieve this
result by requiring the proponent of Convention use to prove that
comity requires first-use of the Convention.41 The decisions rely on
language in Agrospatiale suggesting that the foreign litigant should
have "full and fair opportunity to demonstrate appropriate reasons for
employing Convention procedures in the first instance."One tenable explanation for this pro-forum bias is the evident hostility which courts have for the Convention. This hostility is apparently
the result of lack of familiarity with the Convention because so few
courts hear cases which actually use the Convention." Various courts
suggest that Convention procedures are cumbersome" or do not produce meaningful evidence.4 Even the Supreme Court was openly hostile and critical of the Convention, commenting that "the Letter of
Request procedure authorized by the Convention would be unduly
time consuming and expensive, as well as less certain to produce
needed evidence than direct use of the Federal Rules. 46 Apparently,
the Supreme Court's majority feared subjecting litigants to "the actions or, equally, the inactions of foreign judicial authorities. 4 7 The
fallacy of this fear is reflected by discovery under the Federal Rules,
which often results in a time consuming and inefficient paper chase.4

39. Hudson v. Herman Pfauter GmbH & Co., 117 F.R.D. 33, 37 (N.D.N.Y. 1987).
40. Soci6t Nationale Industrielle Arospatiale, 482 U.S. at 553, 554.
41. See, e.g., Rich v. KIS Cal., Inc., 121 F.R.D. 254 (M.D.N.C. 1988); Benton Graphics
v. Uddeholm Corp., 118 F.R.D. 386 (D.N.J. 1987); Scarminach v. Goldwell GmbH, 531 N.Y.S.
2d 188, 189 (Sup. Ct. 1988); Lyons v. Bell Asbestos Mines, Ltd., 119 F.R.D. 384, 387-89 (D.S.C.
1988). Cf. Perrier Bottled Water Litig., 138 F.B.D. 348 (D.Conn. 1991) (placed burden on
proponent of Convention use, yet held Convention use was appropriate).
42. Socigt Nationale Industrielle Agrospatiale, 482 U.S. at 547.
43. See, e.g., Hudson, 117 F.R.D. at 38 ("we are less familiar with [Convention] procedures
than with the discovery provisions of the Federal Rules").
44. Haynes v. Kleinwefers, 119 F.R.D. 335, 338 (E.D.N.Y. 1988) (use of Convention procedures "can be a very time-consuming and expensive effort").
45. See, e.g., Anschuetz & Co., GmbH, 754 F.2d at 606.
46. Socit6 Nationale Industrielle Agrospatiale, 482 U.S. at 542.
47. Id.
48. See, e.g., Hudson, 117 F.R.D. at 38 ("discovery under the Federal Rules is so liberal
that the costs of litigation may be increased rather than reduced . . . since litigants... are
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Indeed, Blackmun's opinion correctly points out that "the Court offers
no support for this [statement] and until the Convention is used extensively enough for Courts to develop experience with it, such state' 9
ments can be nothing other than speculation. 1
Lower court applications of Arospatiale's ad hoc comity analysis
are criticized for their general inattention to foreign sovereign interests
and notions of international comity.- In Benton Graphics v. Uddeholm
Corp., 51 the court required the proponent of Convention use to prove
that the sovereign interests involved necessitated the Convention's
use. Thereafter, the proponent produced a declaration by the Assistant
Under-Secretary of the Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs which
stated that Swedish interests in limiting discovery and preventing
"fishing expeditions" compelled the Convention's use. Embarrassingly,
the court regarded this sovereign declaration as merely stating general, rather than specific, reasons why Sweden preferred its own discovery rules and, therefore, refused to grant the sovereign declaration
much weight. 52
Unfortunately, this disregard for foreign sovereign interests emanates not only from the lack of guidance provided by the A~rospatiale
majority, but also from the majority's own disregard for foreign
sovereign interests. Although four states submitted amicus curiae
briefs - France, Federal Republic of Germany, Switzerland, and
Great Britain - the Supreme Court failed to respond to their concerns,
except for a statement which supported a very general and patently
obvious assertion3 and a minor footnote reference to France's position.4 Given the Court's own mandate to balance the sovereign interests involved, it is fairly surprising, and extremely disappointing,
that the Court did not discuss the views expressed by foreign signatories to the Convention, or at least examine how those signatories
interpret the Convention.
However, one recent lower court decision is encouraging - In re
PerrierBottled Water Litigation.- In Perrier,the French defendants

commonly flooded with irrelevant documents ...
and often must expend substantial resources
to have attorneys and experts wade through them").
49. SociMt4 Nationale Industrielle A~rospatiale, 482 U.S. at 542.
50. Justice Blackmun's minority opinion also correctly predicted that lower courts would
give little weight to the interests of other sovereign states. Id. at 552.
51. 118 F.R.D. at 386.
52. Id. at 391.
53. Soci4t Nationale Industrielle Agrospatiale, 482 U.S. at 504.
54. Id. at 529 n.ll.
55. 138 F.R.D. at 348.
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filed a motion for a protective order requesting all discovery to be
made in accordance with the Convention. The court, although expressing a preference for Justice Blackmun's tripartite analysis, applied
the ad hoc comity analysis dictated by the A~rospatiale majority.
Despite placing the burden on the French defendants to show that
application of Convention procedures was necessary, the court,
nevertheless held that the Convention should be used in the first
instance. Moreover, the court explicitly retained authority to order
production under the Federal Rules at a later time.
Specifically, the court found that all three prongs of the ad hoc
comity analysis pointed to the Convention's use. First, the discovery
requests were not narrowly tailored, but instead sought large volumes
of information, much of which was irrelevant. Second, French
sovereign interests were clearly involved since the discovery requests
sought evidence from French citizens, within the boundaries of France,
yet without French permission. Lastly, the court held that inconveniences, such as the Convention's more time consuming procedures,5
are insufficient by themselves to outweigh deference to France's
sovereign interests. The court recognized that the mere act of joining
the Convention reflects a significant expression of sovereign interests
which is entitled great weight in favor of the Convention's use. It is
ironic, in final analysis, that a lower court, rather than the Supreme
Court, would emphasize the foreign sovereign's interests and concerns.
V.

FOREIGN RESPONSES TO EXTRATERRITORIAL
DISCOVERY REQ-UJESTr

Given the obvious interests of foreign signatories to the Convention, as evidenced by the amicus curiae briefs filed in Agrospatiale,
examination of foreign signatories' interpretations of the Convention
may be helpful. Indeed, the Agrospatiale majority itself defined comity
as "the recognition which one nation allows within its territory to the
legislative, executive or judicial acts of another nation.57 Additionally,
American interpretations of international accords traditionally have
relied upon the interpretations of international accords by sister sig-

56. The Court refused to accept the plaintiffs' unsupported speculation that Convention
procedures were ineffective, instead believing that requests under the Convention are honored
expeditiously. Id. at 355.
57. Socit, Nationale Industrielle A6rospatiale, 482 U.S. at 543 n.27, quoting Hilton v.
Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 163-64 (1985).
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natories 5 In this context, examinations of foreign blocking statutes,
judicial interpretation and government positions lead to the conclusion
that the U.S. stands alone in its interpretation of the Convention.
A.

Blocking Statutes

Due to the conflict between U.S. discovery methods and discovery
methods of other countries, U.S. discovery requests transmitted
abroad have generated a certain amount of friction. This friction has
led not only to the adoption of the Convention, but also to the enactment of "blocking" statutes designed to counter U.S. efforts to require
extraterritorial production of information. Blocking statutes generally
prohibit the disclosure, copying, inspection, or removal of information
located in the territory of the enacting state in compliance with the
orders of a foreign sovereign. Foreign defendants take advantage of
these blocking statutes and the foreign compulsion defense 9 to avoid
U.S. discovery requests.
Blocking statutes generally are of three types. First, some statutes
prohibit disclosure pursuant to foreign discovery orders unless the
orders are passed through the appropriate channels. Second, other
statutes give the enacting government discretionary authority to prohibit compliance with the discovery order. Third, most statutes give
the enacting government discretion to prohibit disclosure of particular
types of information or information about particular industries.
Blocking statutes are interested primarily in preventing what the
enacting state views as an infringement of its sovereignty. The infringement occurs when a foreign country attempts to obtain evidence
located in the enacting state's territory via the foreign country's discovery methods. To some extent, the hostility directed toward U.S.
discovery orders also results from a dislike of substantive U.S. law.
For instance, in the late 1970s, as evidence of a worldwide cartel of
uranium producers emerged, private litigants and the U.S. Department of Justice sought to enforce U.S. antitrust laws by obtaining
evidence from England, Australia, Canada, France and South Africa.
All foreign governments involved enacted some form of blocking legis-

58. See Diane M. Peters, Application of the Hague Evidence Convention to American
Litigants: Incorporatingthe Subsequent Interpretationsof Signatory States Into the Analysis
of the U.S. Judiciary, 67 WASH. U. L.Q. 243 (1989).
59. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES § 441 (1987).
60. See, e.g., Canada: Uranium Information Security Regulations, Prov. Can. Stat. 19762368, Stat. 0. & R. 76-644 (Sept. 21, 1976), replaced by Prov. Can. Stat. 1977-2923, Stat. 0.
& R. 77-836 (Oct. 13, 1977) in implementation of the Atomic Energy Control Act, 1970, § 9,
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lation 6° to prevent U.S. investigation of the cartel, which was either
61
expressly or tacitly approved by those governments.
However, the majority of blocking statutes are intended to prohibit
overreaching U.S. discovery from occuring in the blocking statute's
country. Blocking statutes can effectively prohibit disclosure of evidence under the Convention. Article 12 of the Convention contains an
exception to the mandatory execution of a discovery request if the
request offends the requested state's sovereignty or security.6 However, it seems that states which have enacted blocking statutes are
concerned less with prohibiting disclosure than with expressing preference for the Convention's use and review of the request by their
own judiciary.
For instance, France enacted a penal law in 1980 to prohibit disclosure of information. The penal law was motivated, in part, by American
disregard of Convention procedures 63 and, in part, by a desire to
hinder the enforcement of American antitrust laws.- This statute prohibits transmission of economic, commercial, or financial information
that would threaten French interests, unless required by an international agreement. 65 Also, the statute prohibits any person from requesting such information for use in a foreign judicial proceeding,
whether or not it threatens French interests, unless required by an
international agreement. 66 Thus, the French law does require compliance with discovery requests if the foreign litigant uses the Convention's procedures. This exception demonstrates France's desire that
foreign litigants use the agreed-to procedures of the Convention.
England also limited the extent to which foreign states may request
the discovery of evidence in the United Kingdom (U.K.) by enacting

Can. Rev. Stat. ch. A-16 (but cite as Atomic Energy Control Act, R.S., c. A-19, § 1), Foreign
Extraterritorial Measures Act, Stat. Can. 1984, c. 49; South Africa; Second General Amendment
Act 94, 1974, § 2, 12 Stat. S. Africa 602.
61. See Westinghouse Elec. Corp. & Duquesne Light Co., (1977) 16 O.R. 2d at 282, 285
("uranium cartel . .. composed of uranium producers in Australia, South Africa, France, and
Canada and their respective Governments") ('"iformal marketing arrangement among non-U.S.
producers of uranium ....
with the approval, and in many instances, at the specific request of
the Government of Canada"). Id.
62. Id. at 281.
63. See Peters, supra note 58, at 259, citing Brigette E. Herzog, Current Developments:
The 1980 French Law on Documents and Information, 75 AM. J. INrL L. 382 (1981).
64. Id., citing Bate C. Toms, III, The French Response to ExtraterritorialApplication of
United States Antitrust Laws, 15 INrL LAW. 585, 596 n.41. (1981).
65. French Penal Law No. 80-538, art. 1, reprinted in 75 AM. J. INrL L. 382 (1981).
66. Id., art. 1 bis.
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two pieces of legislation. The Evidence Act of 197567 was passed to
give effect to the principles of the Conventionr and to give English
courts the power to order compliance with foreign discovery requests,
provided the request was made by a foreign court for use in a civil
proceeding. Five years later, the Protection of Trading Interests Act
of 198069 limited foreign discovery requests by granting the Secretary
of State discretion to prohibit compliance with a foreign discovery
request if the request threatened the State's security or foreign relations. 70 Together, these two statutes give English courts more power
to refuse foreign discovery request than does the Convention itself.
This suggests a legislative belief by the U.K. that Convention procedures should be utilized by foreign litigants, while retaining additional
judicial discretion to forbid compliance if they are not. However, English case law suggests a general willingness to comply, if possible,
71
with foreign discovery requests.
B.

Foreign Judicial Interpretationof the Convention

Not surprisingly, no other country has litigated issues surrounding
the Convention's use as much as the U.S. However, available case
law from both the U.K. and the Federal Republic of Germany suggest
a preference for the use of Convention procedures and a willingness
to provide judicial assistance to foreign courts if requested discovery
methods are consistent with their internal law and do not amount to
a "fishing" expedition. English and German courts, although generally
willing to comply with foreign discovery request, are not reluctant to
narrow the scope of a discovery request if the request exceeds the
scope of permissible discovery under their laws.
In re Westinghouse Uranium Contract,72 the English Queen's
Bench reviewed letters of request issued by a U.S. district court
seeking the production of documents located in England and the oral
examination of the officers and directors of a British corporation. Noting first that "the spirit of the [Hague Evidence Convention] . . . is

67.
68.
69.
70.

Evidence Proceedings in Other Jurisdictions Act, ch. 34 (1975) (Preliminary Note).
Rio Tinto Zinc Corp., [1978] W.L.R. 1.
Protection of Trading Interests Act of 1980, ch. 11 (1980).
Id. § 2.

71. See, e.g., J. Barber & Sons v. Lloyd's Underwriters, [1987] 1 Q.B. 103, 105 ("the
underlying principle is that the English Court should be sympathetic to the request of the
foreign court").
72. Rio Tinto Zinc Corp., [1978] 2 W.L.R. 81. This litigation related to the private antitrust
claims against the alleged uranium producers cartel discussed earlier.
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to enable judicial assistance to be given to foreign courts," the court
gave effect to requests for particular documents but "blue penciled"
overbroad requests which were viewed as a fishing expedition. 4 In
addition, the court refused to allow examination of the witnesses, even
under a grant of immunity, when it became clear that the evidence
was to be used in antitrust proceedings of a penal character. The
court's refusal was based upon the nature of the proceeding (antitrust)
which was not a "civil or commercial matter" to which the Convention
applied. Clearly, the court felt this was an infringement of the juris5
diction and sovereignty of the U.K.7
More recently, in J. Barber & Sons v. Lloyd's Underwriters,76the
court adhered to an "underlying principle ... that the English court
should be sympathetic to the request of the foreign court."v The court
allowed depositions taken in England to be recorded on videotape
even though video recording of evidence given in English courts was
not permitted by English procedural rules. Finding that the requested
method was not excessively contrary to English procedures, the court
allowed the procedure. This action suggests a general willingness to
provide assistance to foreign courts if the discovery request is not
expressly contrary to English law.
The only available translated German case which deals with a request to provide judicial assistance for discovery also suggests a general willingness by Germany to comply with letters of request to the
fullest extent possible under German law. In Corning Glass Works v.
InternationalTelephone & Telegraph Corp., 7a U.S. letter of request
sought the production of documents and examination of witnesses.
The Bavarian Ministry of Justice complied with the request for oral
examination of witnesses but denied the request for production of
documents based on Germany's declaration concerning Article 23 of
the Convention that Germany will not execute pre-trial discovery requests for documents. Despite minor defects in the letter of request,
the appellate court ignored the defects and allowed the oral examination order because of
the desire of the Federal Republic of Germany to place judicial assistance with the United States, which previously was

73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.

Id.
Id.
Id.
[1987] 1 Q.B. 103.
Id. at 105.
No. 9 Va 4/80 (Munich Ct. App. Nov. 27, 1980), reprinted in 20 I.L.M. 1025 (1981).
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carried out only on the basis of comity, on a solid treaty
basis . . . and thereby also to take due account of the procedural device of 'pretrial discovery' which is unknown in
German procedural law, but . . . a fundamental part of an
American civil proceeding. 79
In addition, the court also rejected the German defendant's arguments that the request was for pretrial discovery, not intended for
use in a judicial proceeding, and therefore inappropriate. In rejecting
this argument, the court explicitly recognized that American pretrial
discovery presupposes a pending judicial proceeding.80 Thus, like the
English decisions, the Corning Glass decision illustrates the willingness of German courts to comply with the American discovery request
to the fullest extent possible under German law if the request is
transmitted using Convention procedures.
C.

Positions Expressed by Foreign Signatory Governments

Foreign governments made known their positions regarding the
applicability of Convention procedures through the filing of diplomatic
protests and of amicus curiae briefs. The amicus curiae briefs filed
in support of the French petitioners in Agrospatiale clearly show the
U.K., France, and Germany 8 prefer either first-use of the Convention
or mandatory and exclusive use of the Convention procedures.
The U.K., which did not view the Convention as the exclusive
method for obtaining evidence abroad, advanced the notion that the
requesting state should respect a signatory state's requirement that
the Convention be used exclusively. Further, the U.K. felt that U.S.
courts "should not lightly reject such expressions of foreign sovereign
authority," such as the French blocking statute at issue in Agrospatiale.In its brief, Germany pointed to the willingness of German courts
to assist American courts in obtaining evidence in Germany. 8 Germany

79. 20 I.L.M. at 1036-1037.
80. Id. at 1039.
81. Soci&t6 NationaleIndustrielle Mrospatiale, 482 U.S. at 522. France, United Kingdom,
and the Federal Republic of Germany were the only Convention signatories filing briefs with
the Supreme Court in Soci6tM Nationale Industrielle Arospatiale.
82. Amicus Brief for the Governments of The United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern
Ireland, cited in Socig4t Nationale Industrielle Arospatiale, 482 U.S. at 522.
83. Id.
84. Amicus Brief for the Federal Republic of Germany, cited in Soci4t4 Nationale Industrielle AMrospatiale, 482 U.S. at 522.
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clearly views the use of Convention procedures as mandatory in Germany and views U.S. disregard of Convention procedures as an infringement of German judicial sovereignty.
Similarly, France argued Convention procedures were the exclusive method for discovery of evidence located in France. 6 If the Convention procedures were not exclusive, France and other civil law
signatories would have no incentive to enter into the treaty if the
Convention did not signify a U.S. commitment to use Convention
procedures. s7 France pointed out, as did Germany, that U.S. attempts
to discover evidence located in France without using Convention procedures constituted a violation of French judicial sovereignty. Thus,
the U.K. does not view the Convention as exclusive unless the requested sovereign indicates that it is exclusive. Both France and Germany indicate Convention procedures to be exclusive and mandatory
by their enactment of blocking statutes. Therefore, the U.K., France
and Germany view U.S. discovery requests which circumvent the
Convention as an infringement of their judicial sovereignty.
VI.

PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO FEDERAL RULES OF
CIVIL PROCEDURE

In 1990, the Judicial Conference of the United States approved
proposed amendments to Rules 26 and 28 of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure and sent the amendments to the Supreme Court for
review.- Presently, the Supreme Court continues to review the
amendments and notified Congress that delivery of the proposed
amendments would be delayed. 89 Thus, if the Supreme Court forwards
the amendments to Congress by May 1, 1992, and the amendments
are not disapproved by Congress, the proposed amendments could
take effect as early as December 1, 1992.90 One of the proposed amendments would add the following language to Rule 26(a):

85. Id.
86. Amicus Brief for the Republic of France, cited in Soci6Md Nationale Industrielle A6rospatiale, 482 U.S. at 522.
87. Id.
88. The Supreme Court has until May 1 of each year to submit new rules to Congress for
approval. The procedure for Congressional approval is passive - Congressional inaction means
approval. The rules may go into effect no earlier than Dec. 1 of the same year if Congress does
not disapprove. See 28 U.S.C.A. §§ 2072, 2074 (West Supp. 1991).
89. See Thomas Reisenberg & Joseph Franco, Discovery in Foreign Lands; Proposed Federal Rule ProvidesRespect For InternationalComity While Liberating Domestic Enforcement
From Treaty, RECORDER, June 6, 1991.
90. See 28 U.S.C.A. § 2072 (West Supp. 1991).

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/fjil/vol6/iss2/3

16

Cotter: The HagueHAGUE
Convention:
Selfish
U.S. Interpretation Aggravates Fore
EVIDENCE
CONVENTION

Discovery at a place within a country having a treaty with
the United States applicable to such discovery shall be conducted by methods authorized by the treaty unless the court
determines that those methods are inadequate or inequitable
and authorizes other discovery methods not prohibited by
the treaty. 91
This proposed amendment would preclude use of the Arospatiale
comity analysis when discovery is requested within the territory of a
foreign signatory to the Convention. In that instance, the proposed
amendment would raise a presumption of first-resort for Convention
procedures unless "those methods are inadequate or inequitable." The
amendment is similar to the first-resort rule espoused by Justice
Blackmun in his Adrospatiale dissent.- However, the Advisory Committee Notes limit the first-resort presumption to discovery requests
made upon foreign parties over which the court does not have personal
jurisdiction.9 The Advisory Committee Notes state:
The rule of comity stated in this rule does not apply to
discovery of documents and things from parties who are
subject to the court's personal jurisdiction, and who may be
required to produce such materials at the place of trial ....
The rule also does not apply to the taking of depositions of
parties who may be deposed within the United States. 94
Apparently, once the court obtains personal jurisdiction over a
party who can produce materials or be deposed in the U.S., the proposed amendment no longer requires first-use of the Convention. Unfortunately, the proposed amendment is silent as to which discovery
method is to be used in this situati6n. Courts are left guessing whether
an Adrospatiale ad hoc comity inquiry is appropriate, or whether
direct discovery under the Federal Rules is proper. In addition, the
Advisory Committee Notes exacerbate the uncertainty further by insisting that "comity may be employed in matters to which the require-

91. Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Committee on Rules
of Practice and Procedure of the Judicial Conference of the United States (Sept. 1990) (hereinafter
Proposed Rules).
92.

Socit Nationale Industrielle MroAspatiale, 482 U.S. at 522.

93. This would reverse the holding of cases such as Rich v. KIS California, Inc., 121 F.R.D.
254 (M.D.N.C. 1988), which allowed use of Federal Rules of discovery for purposes of deciding
issues of personal jurisdiction of the objecting French defendants.
94. Proposed Rules, supra note 91, rule 26 advisory committee notes subdivision (a).
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ment of the rule does not apply. '95 Thus, if the first-resort rule is not
applicable, comity "may be employed" and, apparently, is not mandatory. Just what then are the contours of the comity analysis under
the proposed rules?
One tenable argument is that the proposed first-resort rule of comity, applicable when discovery occurs in a foreign territory, negatively
implies that first-resort is not required by principles of comity in all
other situations. This interpretation would inevitably result in the
same pro-Federal Rules bias predicted by Justice Blackmun and evident in subsequent lower court applications of the comity analysis.-'
Whether this result is intended by the proposed rule is open to debate
and certain to invite yet more litigation if the proposed rule is passed
in its present form.
Additionally, the proposed first-resort rule may still be bypassed
if the court determines the Convention's procedures are inadequate
or inequitable. However, neither the proposed amendment nor the
Advisory Committee Notes guide the determination of when discovery
in a foreign territory is inadequate or inequitable. If the foreign signatory enacted a blanket Article 23 declaration against executing pretrial discovery requests for documents, is that sufficient to render
foreign discovery inadequate or inequitable? If so, a party who desires
to use the Federal Rules for discovery need only make a request for
pretrial discovery of documents. Similarly, a blocking statute which
vests a government agency of a foreign signatory with the discretion
to prohibit compliance with the request may render the Convention's
procedures inadequate, leaving litigants and courts the loophole necessary to use the Federal Rules. If lower courts have no guidance on
these issues, this exception may swallow the first-resort rule since
most signatories made Article 23 declarations or enacted blocking legislation. Thus, the intended effect of the proposed amendment may be
nullified if the contours of "inadequate or inequitable" are not clarified.
Another problem with the proposed amendment is its apparent
silence regarding an issue which has already troubled lower courts the allocation of the burden of proof in favor of, or against, the use
of Convention procedures.- The proposed amendment's text states
that "discovery shall be conducted by ... the treaty unless . . . those
methods are inadequate or inequitable," which supports the conclusion
that, the burden is on the party seeking Federal Rules discovery. This

95.
96.
97.

Id.
See supra note 40 and accompanying text.
See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
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is true where discovery occurs in a foreign country. But neither the
proposed amendment nor the Advisory Committee Notes indicate the
applicable burden of proof in other cases (i.e., when the court obtains
personal jurisdiction over a party and orders that party to produce
information in the U.S.). In addition, existing case law usually places
the burden of proof on the party seeking the Convention's use,9 which
is contrary to the proposed amendment's mandatory language and
leaves courts little or no guidance on an already troublesome issue.
Thus, while the proposed amendment seeks to advance comity
considerations through a first-resort rule applicable to discovery in a
foreign signatory's territory, the ambiguity of the rule leaves lower
courts further adrift than currently under the Arospatiale analysis.
Specifically, the proposed amendment does not indicate what rule or
method of analysis is appropriate once personal jurisdiction is established over a foreign party who can produce the materials in the U.S.
Secondly, the proposed amendment may be interpreted to mean that
a first-resort rule may only apply to discovery physically occurring in
the foreign territory. Third, the conditions under which a court may
disregard the first-resort rule are not delineated. Finally, the amendment is silent as to the burden of proof issue.
VII.

AN ALTERNATIVE FRAMEWORK FOR THE PROPOSED
DISCOVERY RULES

As demonstrated by Agrospatiale'slack of guidance, the divergent
decisions in subsequent lower court cases, and the ambiguity of the
proposed amendment, there is no easy way to resolve the fundamental
conflict between U.S.-style discovery and discovery in other countries
while still satisfying U.S. interests in full and meaningful discovery.
However, foreign judicial and government interpretations of the Convention make it clear that foreign signatories view Convention use as
mandatory for U.S. discovery requests, especially where the foreign
signatory enacts blocking statutes designed to force compliance with
Convention procedures. Keeping in mind that foreign governments
will examine U.S. discovery requests under their internal discovery
procedures, whether or not the request is transmitted directly under
the Federal Rule or under Convention procedures, the author believes
that a general rule requiring prior resort to Convention procedures
will best advance U.S. interests in a smooth-functioning discovery
mechanism while still providing meaningful discovery.

98.

Id.
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First, foreign case law suggests that requests transmitted via Convention procedures are met not with judicial hostility, but rather with
a willingness to fulfill the request to the fullest extent possible under
the requested state's internal law.9
Second, although many U.S. courts and commentators, and a
majority of the Supreme Court, consider the Convention procedures
to be unduly time-consuming and cumbersome, there is little practical
support for this position since use of the Convention has been so
limited that U.S. judges and lawyers are grossly unfamiliar with its
procedures. Significantly, the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (hereinafter SEC) seems to be one of the few parties with significant extraterritorial discovery experience using both the Federal
Rules and the Convention procedures. The SEC maintains that discovery under the Convention procedures results in unnecessary expense
and delay, whereas discovery under the Federal Rules leads to prompt
and successful discovery. 100 However, the SEC admits that its experience as a government entity is certainly not typical and has little
relevance to use of Convention procedures by private parties.1o1 The
SEC further admits that private plaintiffs "have found resort to the
Convention more successful. ' ' 1°2 The reason the SEC is more successful
using the Federal Rules may be twofold. First, SEC experiences using
the Convention may be protracted by collateral litigation of issues
unique to its status as a government agency. For example, it has been
argued that SEC administrative enforcement does not fit under the
Convention's coverage of "civil and commercial matters."' ° Second,
favorable experiences of the SEC in obtaining extraterritorial discovery under the Federal Rules may be, in part, the product of bilateral
agreements for exchanging information on insider trading cases.104

99. See supra note 40 and accompanying text.
100. See Reisenberg & Franco, supra note 89.
101. See Amicus Brief for United States and Securities Exchange Commission, cited
in Societg Nationale Industrielle Adrospatiale, 482 U.S. at 522.
102. Id.
103. See Testimony of Constandi Nasser, Trib. Admin. de Paris, 6eme § - 2eme chambre,
No. 5154616 (Dec. 17, 1985), cited in Socidt4 Nationale Industrielle A6rospatiale, 482 U.S. at
537 n.20 (The French Ministry of Justice rejected such an attack and was upheld on appeal.
However, by that time the SEC had settled the litigation and did not seek further enforcement
of the letter of request.).
104. See, e.g., Switzerland-United States: Memorandum of Understanding to Establish
Mutually Acceptable Means for Improving InternationalLaw Enforcement Cooperationin the

Field of Insider Trading, 22 I.L.M. 1 (1983); United Kingdom-United States: Memorandum of
Understanding on Exchange of Information in Matters Relating to Securities and Futures, 25
I.L.M. 1431 (1986) (signed by the SEC, the CFTC, and the United Kingdom Department of
Trade and Industry).
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Thus, although its experience using the Convention is relevant, the
SEC's position cannot be taken as dispositive of the efficiency of Convention procedures.
Third, as Convention use becomes more familiar, for both U.S.
judges and litigants as well as the requested courts, the likely result
is that use of Convention procedures will provide timely discovery.
This result is certainly achievable if measured against the extensive
time frame involved in current U.S. domestic discovery. In addition,
the time saved by avoiding the current ad hoc comity analysis, as
well as collateral litigation in the requested state seeking to limit
overbroad U.S. discovery requests, may actually offset any increased
time frame needed to proceed under the Convention rather than the
Federal Rules. In any event, absent any significant time saving resulting from use of Convention procedures, paternalistic desire for convenient and timely U.S. litigation should not be allowed to undercut the
deference which should be shown to the sovereign interests of other
Convention signatories.
Fourth, use of Convention procedures at the outset, even if not
fully satisfying the requesting litigant, will at least work to narrow
some of the issues by producing some of the needed information. In
addition, the use of Convention procedures may clarify the requested
state's objections so further discovery requests can be narrowly tailored to bypass the objection.
Finally, any "unacceptable asymmetries"105 arising when the use
of Convention procedures constrains a U.S. litigant, while a foreign
adversary enjoys full blown Federal Rules discovery, may be easily
eliminated by a U.S. court under its express authority to control
discovery in the interest of fairness.'°6
Despite the advantages of adopting a prior resort rule, a major
difficulty remains in determining and defining appropriate exceptions
to such a rule. Options include the "inadequate or inequitable" standard
of the proposed rules or the "futile . . . or . . unhelpful" standard
referred to by Justice Blackmun in his dissent. 107 Appropriate exceptions also may be allowed to enable discovery under more liberal
bilateral agreements when applicable. Arguably, an Arospatialecomity analysis, weighted heavily in favor of first-resort and placing the
burden of overcoming the first-resort rule on the litigant seeking use
of Federal Rules discovery, may work.

105.
106.
107.

Soci~tg Nationale Industrielle A#rospatiale, 482 U.S. at 539 n.25.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(c).
Socigt4 Nationale Industrielle Arospatiale, 482 U.S. at 548-49.
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The point is, appropriate exceptions, geared toward considerations
of international comity and a smooth functioning mechanism for taking
evidence abroad, can be adequately defined and delineated. Based on
the foregoing discussion and observations and the shortcomings of the
proposed amendment to the Federal Rules currently under consideration by the Supreme Court, now is the appropriate time for the U.S.
to reaffirm its commitment to international comity and place its interpretation of the Convention on a solid treaty basis with other signatories by adopting a first-resort rule for Convention procedures.
Mark A. Cotter
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